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Abstract
In this paper we compare the reform experiences of China and India focusi g on three specific
areas of industrial policy.  We begin with a comparison of the macro economic performance of the
two countries and find that excepon the inflation front China is better placed than India.  China has
grown at almost double the rate of India largely because of very high savings and investment rates.
Of course, economic reforms have provided the necessary poli y environment for China to attain and
sustain high growth.   
First we compare the extent of deregulation in China and India in the areas of  prices, labor
and land laws, and exit policy for firms.  We find that the non-state sector of China, which is the main
driving force of China’s impressive growth has performed so well largely because it operates primarily
under market conditions.  China has gone far ahead of India in respect of deregulation of their non-
state sector.  Price reforms have been extensive, labor is mobile, labor laws are liberal, and firms are
free to enter and exit from the market.  The results achieved in the process speak for themselves. In
India, by contrast, much needs to be done for private sector deregulation, price reform has been
limited,  labor and land ws are stringent, and while firms have no entry barriers, they do, however,
face strong exit barriers.  Second, we draw comparison between the Chinese township and village
enterprises and the Indian small scale industries.  While these have been promoted in both the
countries through preferential policies, however, their objectives have been different, and hence the
results.  Chinese small enterprises are given initial support only as against the policy in India wherein
incentives are available as long as a firm remains in small scale. Moreover, in India, items are reserved
to be produced exclusively by the small scale industry.  While both have grown overtime, the ones
in China have grown much faster.   Finally, we compare special economic z nes of China with export
processing zones of India.  We find that although both the countries have offered similar incentives
to prospective investors, the story is very different in the two countries.  The zones in China have
been highly successful in attracting foreign investment, promoting exports, and generating
employment than they have been in India.  We identify a number of factors for the performance
differentials in the two countries. 
Nirupam Bajpai is Development Associate at the Harvard Institute for International Development.
Tianlun Jian was a Research Associate at the Harvard Institute for International Development wh
this paper was written and is now a investment analyst  at the Caspian Asset Management, New
York.
Jeffrey D. Sachs i  the Director of the Harvard Institute for International Development and the Galen
L. Stone Professor of International Trade at the Department of Economics, Harvard University.
      World Development Report, 1995, p 162. While the levels of per capita GNP data for both countries may be1
questionable, our intention is to compare the trend.
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Economic Reforms in China and India:
Selected Issues in Industrial Policy 
I. Introduction
China and India have differed markedly in growth performanc  over the past seventeen years.
There are several reasons to explain such diverging trends, the most obvious being the success of
China’s economic reforms. Compared with India, China has been able to attain and maintain very high
savings and investment rates.  Furthermore, China initiated the process of economic reforms as early
as 1978, while India id not commence its reform push until 1991. In addition, initial conditions in
China were much more conducive for higher growth. In fact, because India’s  reforms were crisis-
induced, the initial conditions in the two countries were quite dissimilar. 
 In this paper, we undertake an in-depth analysis of the policies that have affected macro-
economic performance in both countries and attempt to establish their linkages with growth
performances.  We identify and analyze the reasons for the impressive growth of China’s non-state
sector and explain, giving examples,  how the deregulation measures have been instrumental in
China’s success.  In order to illustrate the point, we take the exampl  of Chinese township and village
enterprises (TVEs) and the special economic zones (SEZs).  For comparative purposes, we study
small scale industry (SSI) and the export processing zones (EPZs), respectively, in India.   We draw
lessons for the SSIs and EPZs in India from the experiences of the TVEs and SEZs in China.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the macroeconomic performance of
China and India.  Section III aalyzes  certain aspects of deregulation, such as prices, labor and land
laws, labor mobility, and entry/exit policies.   Section IV studies the role of Chinese township and
village enterprises in enhancing China’s growth, and draws relevant lessons for the Indian small scale
industry.   In Section V we study policies relating to special economic zones in China and export
processing zones in India, and analyze their impact on capital infl ws and export performance. Finally
in Section VI we present concluding remarks. 
II. Macroeconomic performance
Both China and India belong to the group of low-income econo ies.  Although China’s GNP
per capita in 1980 was $290 and Indi ’s was $240, the gap, however, widened considerably to $490
and $300, respectively, in 1993.   Since the 1980s, China’s growth rates have been about twice that1
of India, thanks to the economic reforms in China. Apart from significant changes in China’s
economic policies that contributed to high growth, there are, however, several other important
differences in the macroeconomies of the two countries which may explain the differing performances.
2Table 1: Macro Indicators
China India#1
GDP growth 1980-93 9.97% 5.26%
Population growth 1980-931.4% 2.0%
Fertility rate1992 2.0% 6.1%




Employment (organized sector, million)#2











1978   0.7%   n.a.
1985   8.8%   6.7%
1993 13.2%   5.6%
1995 14.8%   5.0%
Openness Ratio
1978   9.8% n.a.
1980 12.6% 19.5%
1993 32.7% 27.1%
Debt Ratio 1993 95% 291%
Debt Service Ratio 199310%   28%
Source: Calculated by the authors based on data from: CSSB 1992, p 77; CSSB 1995, p 32, 36, 59, 88, 233, 537;  Almanac of China’s
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 1994/95, p 989; People’s Daily, March 7, 1996, p 2; World Debt Tables 1994/95, p 218;
Economic Survey, Government of India, 1994/1995; Reserve Bank of India; Human Development Report 1995, p 88 & 187. World
Development Report 1995, p 162.
Note: #1 Since CSSB 1995 reestimated China’s GDP, the above data could differ if one uses previous versions of CSSB.
#2 Organized sector employment data for Chin  refers to total staff and workers. #3 Refers to retail price index for China, and  consumer
price index for India.
The higher growth rates of domestic savings and investment in China were, to a large extent,
instrumental in achieving the high rates of growth.   While the savings rates in India have bee
between 20 and 23 percent of GDP in the last two decades or so, the ratios f r China h ve been about
one-and-a-half to two times those of India.  By roughly the same proportion, investment rates in
      In 1993, foreign direct investment in China accounted for 10.6% to 15.9% of total domestic investment, using the2
official exchange rate ($1=Yuan 5.80) and swap market rate ($1=Yuan 8.70).
      The substantial decline in China’s population growth rate between 1973-94 is largely responsible for China’s high3
savings rate. 
      Zhou & Dang, China’s Population Situation, 1990, p 194.4
      Calculation based on data from China Population Statistics Yearbook 1995, p 6-10.5
      CSSB 1994, p 106 for urban unemployment rate data.6
      CSSB, People’s Daily, March 7, 1996, p 5.7
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China have been higher than those in India.  (Refer to table 1)  In other words, both countries2
basically have been financing their investment through domestic savings.  The difference in saving
rates thus resulted, to a large extent, in the differential rates of economic growth.  
Explaining the high rate of saving  in China has always been a puzzle.  Although the existing
literature tends to credit this to Chinese culture, here we offer an alternative explanation.  While a
detailed explanation of  why China achieved such high aving rates is beyond the scope of this paper,
we point out some of the most important factors that have contributed to such a  savings rate.  These
include:  a) Change in population growth ates: China had a population growth rate of 2.1 percent
between 1950 and 1973, with the rate falling o 1.4 percent between 1973 and 1994.  b) The abrupt3
change in population growth rates in China implied a change in the population structure, which i
indeed what has happened. The share of the working-age population increased from 59.3 percent4
in 1953 to 66.7 percent in 1994.  c) High economic growth in China enabled the creation of many5
new substantial jobs,  and as a result, the rate of dependency per worker was reduced.  Briefly put,
these factors have contributed significantly towards higher saving rates in China.
Employment is another major macro indicator used to evaluate the health of an economy. 
While employment in the organized sector in China, including staff  and workers, increased from 95
million in 1978 to 148.5 million in 1994, a rise of 56 p rcent,  the number for India, in contrast,  rose
by only 19.7 percent - from 22.9 million to 27.4 million.  Moreover, between 1981 and 1994, India’s
population i creased by 33.82 percent while China’s population increased by 19.8 percent.  In the
case of China, the unemployment rate has always been kept reasonably low.   In 1952, when the
People’s Republic of China was only two years old, the urban unemployment rate was 13.2 percent.6
The Chinese government addressed the unemployment issue as a primary issue head on and
incorporated it into the first five-year plan economic development; by 1957 the rate had come down
to 5.9 percent.   Since the onset of economic reforms, China’s urban unemployment rate has come
down to 2.9 percent in 1995 from 5.3 percent in 1978.   The low unemployment rate for China at7
the start of the reform acilitated reform, and a sustained low unemployment rate provides a healthy
economic environment for China’s reforms in the years to come. With respect to India,
unemployment data is available only for the organized sector. However, the National Sample Survey
Organization (NSSO) provides survey data for both the organized and unorganized sectors on a five-
year basis.   Per  the usual approach, which focuses attention on chronic unemployment, the urban
      For detailed data, refer to Visaria and Minhas, 1991, p 975.8
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unemployment rate stayed roughly constant at 5 to 6 percent for the 1970s and 1980s.   However,
the rural unemployment rate went up slightly, from less than 1 percent to about 2 percent over the
same period.   Although unemployment for India as a whole also stayed relatively constant in this
period the composition of the work units in which  the edu ated workforce is employed has changed.
The proportion of educated people opting for self-employment has risen considerably between 1977-
78 and 1987-88.   This is true for both males and femles in rural and urban areas, thereby indicating8
that India’s employment growth has mainly come from the private sector.
Openness has been increasingly recognized as an important factor f r ttaining higher growth.
 Therefore, reform strategies have, in almost in all countries, included measures for opening up
economies. China and India have been no excepti n. In China, openness  as measured by the ratio of
total trade of goods and service over GDP, rose from 9.8 percent in 1978 to 33 percent in 1993. 
While  4.6 percent of China’s GDP originated from exports in 1978, the ratio rose to 15.3 percent
in 1993.  With a 19.5 percent openness ratio India was much more open than China in 1980.
However, even though India’s external trade as a percent of GDP increased over time, in 1993  her
openness was only 27.1 percent.
 
Debt ratio (total external debt/export earnings) and debt service ratio are two important
indicators often used to determine a country’s health with regard to its external economy.   With the
huge increase in China’s external debt, her debt ratio has been increasing since reform.   However,
both the debt ratio and debt service ratio have been within the safe limits recognized by  international
standards (100 percent for debt ratio and 20 percent for debt service ratio).   To a large extent, this
has been possible because exports have grown so rapidly.  In contrast, despite the fact that India’s
debt profile has been much more favorable (with 47 percent of the total debt on concessional terms),
both the ratios exceeded the safe limits, at 291 percent for debt ratio and 28 percent for debt service
ratio in 1993.
On the downside, higher growth rates in China have been associated with higher inflation. 
China started its reforms with basically no inflation, but it has risen over time and been aggravated
in the recent past.  To a large extent, this trend has emerged due to: the removal of price controls;
hikes in administered prices, especially for agricultural products;   reforms in the distribution system;
fiscal decentralization; a sharp rise in the demand for fixed asset investments; and excessive inflows
of foreign capital.  In the Indian case, high inflation has existed at times for varying reasons. In the
1980s, large and growing fiscal deficits were a major cause of inflation.   The gross fiscal deficit
(center and states) as a percent of GDP rose from 9 percent in 1980-81 to 12.7 percent in 1990-91.
These deficits led to high levels of borrowing by the government from the Central Bank, with an
expansionary impact on the money supply that led  directly to high rates of inflation.   However, over
the last couple of years, inflation has risen particularly because of price reforms, periodic  increases
in the administered prices of food grains, worsening of th  f scal situation due to higher subsidies and
interest payments in 1993-94, and large inflows of foreign capital.  
 Li Lanqin, Beijing Review, vol. 39, No. 2., Jan. 8-12, 1996.9
 Gao, Wang, & He, 1994, p 194. And Xu & Wang, 1994, P 390 also says  that the government set the prices10
for  97% of the total volume of retail commodity sales.
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III. Deregulation: Price Control, Labor Mobility and Entry/Exit Policies
Prior to the economic reforms, China’s economy was rather rigid because of the planned
economic system.  Under such a planned system, control was the key to keeping stability, and  almost
every activity one could think of was regulated.   The main theme of the reform is to move away from
planning  and to deregulate the economy, which is often referred to as the decentralization of decision
making power.   In this section, we look at some  deregulation measures in the areas of prices, labor
mobility, and entry and exit policies.
Price Policy in China
Before 1979, prices were centrally controlled and prices were set by the government.
Enterprises did not have much of a say and there was very little price variation across regions.   For
many products, prices were fixed for decades with the  result that price distortion was a serious
problem, especially in the early years of reform.   To reform the price system, China took the
following steps:  a)  increased agricultural procurement prices in coordination with rural reforms; b)
readjusted price structures in line with production costs, and adjusted price levels across sectors, such
as prices for agricultural products and tools,  for light and heavy industrial goods, and for
transportation and communication; c) introduced a dual-track price system such that prices were
gradually determined by the market. The SOEs gradually increased the share of prices set by the
market while letting the non-state sector have more freedom in price decisions.
After 17 years of refo ms, prices are now basically determined by the market.  According to
Vice Premier Li Lanqin, prices that are determined by market forces are 80 percent for capital goods,
85 percent for agricultural goods, and 95 percent for manufactured consumer goods.   In contrast,9
in 1978, 97 percent of retail prices and 100 percent of prices for material inputs were determined by
the government .10
Labor Mobility in China
Deregulation of labor mobility, especially rural migration, has also contributed significantly
to China’s economic growth. Before the reforms, much labor was wasted and was kept under
capacity for many reasons under the planned economy.  The main reason, perhaps, was the
segregation of rural and urban residents through the household registry system.  Under this  system,
every household was required to register its place of  residence, and was required to seek  permission
to change residences.  Prior to the early 1980s, migration was extremely difficult. For example,
farmers found it very difficult to survive in cities because they were denied access to rationed food
and urban social welfare.  Even urban workers found it difficult to move within a city due to housing
and other considerations.  Hence, under the registry system there was very limited labor mobility.
6Labor mobility has been deregulated in two ways since 1979.  First, by granting the rural
population a choice of economic activities that differs from traditional agriculture, the government
allowed rural residnts set up businesses and work in factories or firms, regardless of their location,
especially after 1984. As a re ult, the surplus rural labor shifted from the agricultural sector to other
sectors.  About 95 million joined the TVEs between 1979 and 1994.  An estimated 80 million of the
rural population migrated into urban area, most of which are  along the coastal regions.  Secondly,
workers were allowed to resign or retire at an early age, and firms w re given the freedom to hire and
set wages. In addition, two other factors also facilitated labor mobility. First, many provinces and
cities, especially the SEZs and  ETDZs,  adopted favorable policies to attract professionals and
graduates, thereby providing immediate housing and favorable benefit packages. Second, to facilitate
the flow of human capital, many city governments set up human capital exchange centers to provide
demand and supply information. 
Entry/Exit Policies in China
China has made attemp s to promote competition through various means.  First, to promote
entry, tax holidays and tax reductions are granted to newly established TVEs, and firms with foreign
investments (as we discussed in Sections III & IV).  Second, demonopolizing state industries has
helped greatly - e.g., Bank of China used to be the only bank allowed to deal with foreign exchange
business.  Subsequently, China International Trust and Investment Corporation was allowed to
conduct foreign operations, as were  all the specialized banks.  Later on, a number of other financial
institutions also joined in.  In 1995, the first domestic private bank, Minsheng Bank, was established
in China.  Thirdly, the Corporation Law was promulgated in 1995. Under this law, firms are allowed
to merge, switch production lines, and close down, if necessary.   Such flexible entry and exit policies,
along with other macro policies, have promoted competition and efficiency in the Chinese economy,
especially along the coastal regions.
Price Policy in India
In India, the government fixes prices of certain agricultural commodities and industrial
products. The agricultural price policy seeks to develop a balanced and integrated price structure
from the perspective of the overall needs of the economy. In addition, the policy is supposed to
ensure remunerative prices to the growers and to safeguard  the interests of the consumer by making
available supplies at reasonable prices. Each season the government announces  procurement/support
prices for major agricultural commodities and organizes purchase operations through public and co-
operative agencies, such as the Food Corp ration of India  (FCI).  The commodities covered for the
fixation of procurement/mi imum support prices  include seven cereals (paddy, wheat, jowar, bajra,
maize, ragi, and barley), four pulses (gram, arhar, moong, and urad), seven oilseeds (groundnut,
sunflower, soyabean, rapeseed and mustard, safflower, tori , and copra), and four other commodities
(sugarcane, cotton, jute, and tobacco).   The prices of these agricultural commodities are fixed by the
government upon the recommendations of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP).
Through a Public Distribution System (PDS), the government supplies six key-essential
commodities at below market rates to  consumers, with access to the system being universal.  In
India, the PDS has been in existence since World War II.  Food grains -- mainly rice and wheat,
7sugar, edible oils, kerosene, and soft-coke  -- are distributed to the public through a network of fair
price shops (FPS).   The PDS aims at insulating the consumer from the impacts of rising prices of
these commodities and maintaining the minimum nutrtional status of the population.  Typically, each
FPS is required to serve a population of 2,000.  As of the end of March, 1994, there were 424,000
fair price shops, of which 324,000  were located in  rural areas and 100,000 in urban areas.  Although
the central government procures, allocates, and supplies these commodities to the states or the union
territories, the latter, in turn, are responsible for the allocation and distribution within their respective
areas.   
   Table 2: Food grain Allocation and Off-take under PDS (million tons)
Wheat Rice
Year Allocation Off-take Allocation Off-take
1990-91 9.50 7.09 9.61 7.87
1991-92 10.36 8.78 11.36 9.94
1992-93 9.24 7.41 11.48 9.36
1993-94 9.56 5.86 12.41 8.88
1993-94(Apr-Dec)7.01 4.03 9.03 6.77
1994-95(Apr-Dec)7.91 3.20 9.90 5.86
Source: Economic Survey, 1994-95, Government of India.
As shown in table 2, the PDS Off-take (amount sold by the FPS) has been declining over the
last three years.  To a large extent, this is explained by the reduced use of PDS by consumers,
particularly in the urban areas.  Studies have shown that consumers perceive grain from open market
outlets to be of higher quality than the grain available at the FPS. This is one of the main reasons for
the declining off-take from the FPS.  It is particularly so in the case of wheat in the wheat-consuming
states.  An overhauling of the public distribution system needs to be done, and  at a minimum, it needs
to be restricted to rural consumers only. Although a number of criteria have been suggested for
improved targeting of the poor and the most vulnerable elements in society, the government has yet
to initiate action on this front.  
By targeting consumers who have access to the system, better quality food grains could be
made available. This could  also help reduce food subsidies.  In 1994-95, the food subsidy budget was
Rs. 400 million; however, the actual amount may turn out to be much higher due to the large volume
of procurement, the higher carrying costs, and the lower off-take from PDS.  In fact, the same
happened in the previous year, too.  Subsidies arise from the difference between the issue price and
the operation costs of the FCI.  For some time now the issue of limiting open-ended subsidies on
account of FCI operations has been discussed in  government. Howver, again no concrete action has
been taken so far.  
With regard to industrial products, prices prior to 1991-92 were fixed for seven commodity
groups.  These were: crude petroleum and natural gas, petroleum products, coal, electricity,
fertilizers, iron and steel, and non-ferrous metals, (excluding aluminum).  However, since the
decontrol/decanalization of steel, non-ferrous metals, and fertilizers (except urea), the major items
8under administered price control are coal, electricity, and petroleum products (though lubricating oil
was decontrolled in November 1993).
Exit Policy, including labor and land laws
Removal of exit barriers is one area in which the Indian reforms have yet to commence.  The
exit policy is a setof policies or measures concerning industrial decline, retrenchment, restructuring
of ailing firms, and liquidation of closed units. Although the government took swift action in
removing the entry barriers that were present fo  decades in such forms as licensing and exclusion of
domestic and foreign investors from many industries, the liberalization of exit barriers has yet to take
place.  In 1993, the government formed the Committee on Industrial Sickness and Corporat
Restructuring (CISCR) to reexamine the regulatory framework of restructuring and liquidation of
corporate firms.  However, no concrete action has so far been taken on the recommendations of the
committee’s report.  
A large number of firms in the private and public sector continue to incur losses, yet stay in
operation through public subsidies, or remain in a state of suspended animation (the state of sick
industrial units) by closing down indefinitely without seeking formal liquidation.  In the process,
workers of closed units lose their jobs without any compe sation, and the owner of the unit may also
lose his locked-in capital.  Creditors, mainly public sector banks, always end up losing their money.
According to the Sick Industrial Companies (special provisions) Act of 1985 (SICA), a unit will be
called sick if the unit is registered for five years  and has accumulated losses in excess of its net worth.
By March 1991, there were approximately 2,269 large and medium size units in the private
sector which were listed as sick -- with a total bad debt of Rs. 57.86 billion.  In the public sector, on
the other hand, there were 109 loss-making enterprises which incurred a total (annual) loss of Rs.
30.64 billion (Tables 3 and 4). In addition, in the publ c sector, the net profit/loss to capital employed
ratio is very small.    
Table 3: Number of Sick Units and Amount of Outstanding Credit per Unit (Private Sector)
                    
Unit 1980 1986 1990
Small scale 000' 23,149 145,776 225,324
credit outstanding Rs. Mn     0.13      0.08      0.11
Medium scale 000'      992     1,250      802#
credit outstanding Rs. Mn       1.8       2.25        NA
Large scale 000'      409        714     1,467
credit outstanding Rs. Mn      32.3              46.0       32.2
# Sick public sector units may also be included in this figure as they are obtained from cross calculations.
Source: Summary Statistics, Center for Monitoring Indian Economy, 1992.
9Table 4: Number of Loss-making Enterprises and Total Amount of Losses Incurred (Public
Sector) 
Unit 1980 1986 1990
Number of operating
enterprises No. 168 214 236
Number of Loss-making
enterprises No.   74 100 109
Total capital employed Rs. Bn 182 518             1,017
Losses of Loss-making
enterprises Rs. Bn  7.6 17.0 30.6
% of Net Profit/Loss
to capital employed Percent  1.1   3.4   2.3  
Source: Eighth Five-Year Plan, 1992-97, Vol. II, Planning Commission, Government of India, p. 123.
Failure to restructure in time results in the firms going bankrupt.  A number of factors such as
hostile unions, legal and regulatory obligations, etc. are responsibl  for firms not restructuring in time
to avoid bankruptcy.   Strong union practices  (protected under the Trade Union Act of 1926 in all
registered firms) have systematically opposed restructuring to various degrees.  
Second, the regulatory framework is such that if a unit has fallen sick, then the unit does not
have the option to restructure on its own.  SICA requires that the unit must be referred to the Board
of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR).  BIFR is the sole regulatory agency for large and
medium-size firms, and restructuring can be done only if the restructuring plan is approved by BIFR.
The consensus approach adopted by BIFR is a major source of the exit problem.  At every level of
mediation and decision making, BIFR uses the consensus approach.  A restructuring plan suggested
by one party needs to be endorsed by all the parties concerned, that is, the management, workers,
creditors, and shareholders.  
Third, legislative barriers have also helped to prevent not allowing firms from restructuring
easily.  Several pieces of  legislation concerning labor and land, which have been in effect since the
mid-1970s, severely restrict the scope of firm restructuring, not to mention the restrictions on the
importation of new technologies and the licensing and regulation of capital which were present in the
pre-1991 period.  Nonetheless, legal provisions for job security and the land-use law have posed
serious obstacles to the process of restructuring.   According to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947,
firms in India employing 100 or more workers are not allowed to retrench or layoff any workers, or
close down a unit without prior permission from the concerned state government.  State governments
have almost never given explicit permission to firms to retrench or close down a unit. Effectively this
law has become a guarantor of job security in priva ely owned large firms, very much in line with the
job security provided to public sector employees.     
. As an exceptional case, according to an order of the Maharashtra government issued in March 1996, the11
National Textile Corporation (NTC) mills have been granted permission to sell their excess land.  The land is being sold
to raise funds for the revival of the chronically sick mills and for their modernization.
10
With regard to the land-use law, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act of 1976  does
not allow firms to sell surplus land in major cities without the permission of the state government.
A large number of sick textile mills in Bombay and Ahmedabad and jute mills around Calcutta are in
possession of surplus land, that could be sold to raise funds for restructuring.  However, the state
governments have systematically denied permission to sell them.   11
    The Urban Land Ceiling Act specifies an upper limit on the size of landed property that an
individual,  a group of people, or a company can own.  In the major metropolitan areas, like Bombay
and Calcutta, the limit is 500 square meters.  In minor cities like Ahmedabad it is 1,000 square meters.
If a firm is in possession of surplus land, it must inform the state government of the amount of surplus
land.  The state government then buys the excess land at some pre-specified rate, which is
significantly lower than the market rate.
Comparison
In the field of deregulation, especially in the areas of prices, labor mobility, and entry/exit
policies for firms, China has gone far beyond India, and the results achieved via deregulation measures
in China speak for themselves.  While pre-reform China was much more regulated and controlled than
pre-reform India, China today has done away with most of those regulations that would normally
hinder the growth of industry.  Price reforms have come a long way in China, and have been a major
reason for the boom in the agricultural sector.  In India, on the other hand, the procurement/support
prices have been raised over time, but are still state-determined.  Besides, as discussed earlier, India
also has a public distribution system through which commodities are made available at subsidized
prices.  Such a system, though widespread extensively in pre-reform China, is now much reduced.
PDS in India needs major overhauling, with improved targeting of the poor and t  vulnerable sectors
of society.  With regard to industrial products, however, prices of several products have been
decontrolled in India over the past five years.
While there have been no restrictions on labor mobility in India, in China it was a major
impediment for attaining higher growth until the commencement of the reforms.   The authorities in
China realized the existence of this bottleneck early on in the reform process and hence undertook
measures to relax the restrictions on labor mobility.  As a consequence, the segmentation of the labor
market in China (between urban and rural labor and agricultural and industrial labor) was removed,
thereby implying that labor was f ee to move from one sector to the other, from rural to urban areas
and so on.  Mobility permitted surplus labor to move from agriculture to engage itself in small
business, or take up employment in the fast-growing rural industry.  The labor market soon began to
be governed by  market forces, thereby unleashing strong forces that promoted growth in the Chinese
economy for years to come.  
Firms in China are relatively free to enter and exit the market as their situations may warrant.
The labor law enacted in 1995 states that both the employee and the employer have to give  30-day
      Social gross output has a double-accounting problem, but GDP data are not available for the TVEs. Here we hope12
to give a sense of the change in national output, rather than in the levels.
      Chen, Junsheng, Township Enterprises: Developing an Export-Oriented Economy, in Beijing Review, Vol. 39,13
No. 2, Jan 8-12, 1996.
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notice to the other party in the event that their labor contract has to be discontinued.  In case the firm
needs to use layoffs due to production difficulties or is on the edge of bankruptcy, the employer has
to make it known, both to employees and the labor union 30 days in advance, and must report it to
the government administrative authority.  By contrast, in India, while entry barriers have been lifted,
there still exist strong exit barriers.  Moreover, even the restructuring of firms in India is severely
constrained because of the stringent regulatory framework that is in place.  Needless to say,
liquidation of firms is out of the question. In India,  large numbers of loss-making firms both in the
private and public sectors  are unable to restructure or exit.  These firms stay in operation through
public subsidies or “go sick” by indefinite closure without going for formal liquidation.  Labor laws
do not allow large firms to lay off workers.  Besides, the land laws are such that firm  cannot sell their
excess land or acquire additional land beyond a certain limit prescribed by the government.
Numerous factors such as hostile trade unions and legal and regulatory obligations do not permi
firms to restructure or exit.  As in China, India needs to have realistic labor and land laws that give
firms the necessary flexibility to conduct their operations. 
IV. Small scale industry: China’s TVEs and India’s small scale enterprises
Both China and India are poor in capital, but abundant in labor, especially unskilled labor. 
With such a resource pattern, development policies that promote labor-intensive industries (and
exports) would hasten the process of economic development and industrialization, as experienced by
the high performing East Asian economies.  Small scale industries in LDCs are u ually a sociated with
low capital intensity and low-skilled labor. As such, promoting such industries would appear to be
the proper economic policy for China and I di .   In this section, we attempt to compare the policies
and development experiences of small scale industries a  their effects on the two economies.  In the
case of China, township and village enterprises (TVEs) are considered instead of small-scale
industries.  Though TVEs cover more than industrial products, given their nature, size, and
government policies, we think such a comparison will be meaningful  and will help us understand the
differences between the two countries’ recent economic development experiences.
China’s TVEs
While China’s overall economic performance has been successful since the reforms were
initiated in 1978,  growth rates for the non-state sector have been extremely impressive.  Within the
non-state sector, the growth of TVEs has been the most spectacular.  TVE share of social gross
output increased from 7.2 percent in 1978 to 42.7 percent in 1993.  The TVE export share increased12
from basically zero to more than one-third i  1994.  TVEs have created about 95 million jobs since13
the reforms began.  The share of TVE employment went up from 7 percent in 1978 to 20.5 percent
in 1993 (Table 5).  In this section, we propose to study why China’s TVEs have grown so fast, and
what conditions and policies provided such an environment for growth.  Then we will study the
      Gao, Wang & He, 1993, p 1678.14
12
Indian development experiences of small scale industry, and see what China and India can learn from
each other. 
Table 5: China’s TVE Development
Years 1978 1984 1991 1993#1
Employment (million) 28.27 52.08   96.09 123.45
Gross output (Billion yuan)   0.49   1.71   11.62   31.54
Units (million)   1.52   6.07   19.09    24.53
Share of National Employment  7.04% 10.8%   16.47%   20.50%
Share of National Gross output  7.20% 12.98%   26.33%   42.73%
Average Employment (person)  18.60   8.60     5.03     5.03
Source: CSSB 1994, p 84-85, p 362-3, CSSB, China Industrial Statistical Yearbook 1994, p 15.
Note: 1978 data do not include TVEs run by groups of households or by individuals. Therefore while other data are under- reported,
average employment per unit is large relativ  to subsequent years due to the fact that they do not include the smaller TVEs run by groups
of households or by individuals.
TVEs basically comprise  all rural enterprises, including all forms of collective ownership,
joint ventures, enterprises incorporated with state-owned enterprises, and private enterprises.
Although they existed before the reforms, they were much smaller in number.  In 1958, China
undertook the Great Leap Forward, wherein the gover m nt required every rural cooperative, which
later turned into the people’s commune, to set up industrial enterprise.  By 1960, th re were 117,000
rural enterprises, which were producing 3.2 billion Yuan r 1.19 percent of the country’s social14
gross output.  During the Cultural Revolution, rural enterprises expanded further for a number of
reasons: a) the government wanted to promote agricultural mechanization, and encouraged “five
small scale industries” in rural areas to satisfy rural demand; b) many enterprises in cities were busy
with political movements rather than production activities, so rural enterprises were set up to meet
rural production purposes; c) large batches of educated youth were sent by the government to settle
in the countryside, and their knowledge facilitated some of the industrial production.   In 1978, the
number of rural enterprises went up to 1.52 million, at which time they were producing 7.2 percent
of the country’s gross social output.  However, the real growth of the TVEs took place after the
reforms. 
Rural reforms began with the replacement of the household responsibility system with the
commune system.  This met with tremendous success and provided a favorable economic
environment for the growth of TVEs. The 1978 to 1984 annual compounded growth rate of grain
production (in physical terms) doubled the rate between 1952 and 1978 (4.95 percent vs 2.41
percent).   The increase in productivity provided peasants with extra i come and resulted in additional
surplus labor.  
While  increased rural savings and cheap local labor provided TVEs with the material basis
for growth, the government established policies that created favorable macro-economic environment
      A Comprehensive Book of Chinese Reforms, Volume on Rural Reforms, p 29.15
      People’s Daily (Overseas Edition), Jan. 24, 1996, p 1.16
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for TVE development.  In 1978, the Third Session of the Eleventh Plenary of the Communist Party
of the China Central Committee (CPCCC) documented that (a) urban factories should support TVEs
(then called commune- and brigade-run enterprises) with equipment and technical guidance so that
some  rural products and tools could be processed by TVEs; (b) TVEs were granted tax reductions
or exemptions depending on their situations.  The government encouraged TVE development
especially in  areas that supported or promoted agricultural production, heavy industry, and exports.
Since then, many governmental policies have been introduced to encourage the growth of
TVEs.  Among them, tax policies have played perhaps the most significant role in TVE development.
Since 1979, newly established TVEs have been given between one- and three-year tax holiday, and
taxes have been either waived or reduced for two to three years for unprofitable TVEs.  In addition
to preferential tax treatm nt, since 1984, TVEs have paid an eight-level marginal corporate tax (see
Table 6), this rate applied until 1994, when all domestic enterprises started to pay a unified tax rate
of 33 percent.   Since TVEs on average are much smaller (only 5 persons on average, see Table 3),
and each one makes a smaller profit than the bigger SOEs, this  marginal tax scheme promoted TVEs
at the expense of the SOEs.  n top of that, large and medium size SOEs were subject to a flat 55
percent tax rate rather than marginal tax rates.
The Spark Plan is another major Chinese government initiative that contributed to TVE
development.   This Plan was initiated in January 1986 to promote rural science and technology
development, and has in effect promoted TVE development.  The Plan targeted the promotion of
small- and medium-size rural enterprises with three main objectives: (a) Provide short-term training
to 200,000 rural educated youth and cadres every year, with a goal of teaching them one or two
techniques applicable in their areas; (b) Mobilize research institutions at the central and provincial
levels to develop 100 full sets of tchnology equipment suitable for rural usage; (c) Help to establish
500 small TVEs as models for further development, providing them with technology, management
knowledge, processing techniques, and quality control measures.   Over the last decade, The Spark15
Plan initiated about 60,000 projects, has made a total investment of 259.2 billion Yuan, and has
trained more than 28 million peasants.16
The Chinese government also generated policies to promote the development of export-
oriented TVEs in thecoastal development regions. Although export oriented TVEs are charged the
same interest rates on loans for technological impr vement projects, they are allowed to pay reduced
corporate tax during the loan repayment period.   TVEs that produce export g ods are rewarded with
0.05 Yuan for every dollar they export.
      Fu, Chunseng, Zhang, Xuewen, & Ma, Qiangxin, 1993, p 66-73.17
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Table 6: China’s Domestic Corporate Tax Rates(1985 - 1993)
    Annual Taxable
Tax Level      Income (Yuan)Tax Rate
    1    <= 1000 10%
    2         1001--- 3,500 20%
    3         3501--- 10,000 28%
    4       10001--- 25,000 35%
    5       25001--- 50,000 42%
    6      50,001--- 100,00048%
    7    100,001--- 200,00053%
    8                   > 200,00055%
Source: The State Tax Bureau, A Comprehensive Book of Tax Laws, 1989, p 319, 342.
Note: For medium and large size SOEs the rate was 55% .
While the central government was setting general guidelines for promoting export-oriented
TVEs, local governments have created various policies to encourage TVE development.  For
instance, to promote exports, the Beijing government now reduces corporate tax by half for TVEs
that export 70 percent or more of their products  if  net earnings increases over the previous year.
And TVEs are allowed to retain 40 to 50 percent of foreign exchange earnings under the retained
foreign exchange earning system.  To encourage high-quality TVE products, the Tianjin government
allows a 5 to 20 percent corporate tax reduction for products that are recognized as high-quality by
the municipal, ministerial, or national governments. The Shaanxi government has spent half of the
money from the Spark Plan to promote advances in suitable technologies for the TVEs.  To17
promote inter-regional TVE development, the central government has mandated that TVEs should
enjoy all preferential policies allowable in the locality in which they are operating, regardless of their
original location. 
Table 7: Loans Extended to TVEs 
(a) Loans Extended during the Year 1985 1988 1990 1992
National Total (billion Yuan)   627 1143 1654 2404
TVEs   (billion Yuan)     35     87   123   188#1
TVE Share of national loan (%)    5.6  7.61  7.44  7.82
(b) TVEs 1979 1980  1990 1992
Loan Balances, (year-end, billion Yuan)         4.4   8.1  116.3 187.8
Loan Balance/100 Yuan Product    8.9  12.0    12.1   10.7
Labor Productivity/Per Person (Yuan)1751 2230 1034216632
Profit before Taxes/Person (Yuan)   389   480   1092  1668
Source: (a) 1992, 1993 Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking p 456 & 356.  (b) China’s TVEs Yearbook 1993, p 476.
Note: #1 includes non-profitable institutions in rural areas.
      The People’s Bank of China, Survey and Statistics Department, China Statistics on Finance and Banking (1952-18
87), 1988, p 145.  The higher interest rate charged on TVEs, however, need not mean bias against them.  The People’s
Bank of China (Central Bank), in 1987, made an announcement that specialized banks were allowed to float lending rate
20% above the base rates.
     Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 1994, p 499.19
      Shi, Banruo. 1994: China’s Tax System Reform, 1994, p 263.20
      Discounted by the overall retail price index, TVE labor productivity would be 755 Yuan per person at 1979's21
value.
      Budget Speech of the Finance Minister - Presenting Central Government’s Budget for 1995-96, [Part-A] p. 822
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Nonetheless, in terms of sources of funds, TVEs basically stand on their own.  TVEs are
encouraged to raise funds within and among enterprises, and from individuals and communities.  In
the early years, TVEs were charged higher interest rates for their operating capital loans.  In 1985,
interest charged on operating capital loans to TVEs was 8.64 percent, compared with 7.92 percent
for the SOEs. However, although we do not know when it began,  TVEs are now  ch rged the same18
interest rates as other enterprises.  The share of loans that TVEs have received has increased from19
a negligible number in 1978 to about 5.6 percent in 1985, and increased more  to 7.8 percent today,
and loan volume has increased by a significant margin every year. (table 7)
Preferential tax policies towards TVEs seem to have been most instrumental in TVE
development.   Tax exemptions or reductions effectively made the average corporate tax rate for
TVEs as low as 21 percent, while the SOEs, on average paid a 29 percent corporate tax rate in
1992.  Cheap labor is definitely a big advantage for TVEs.   In addition, compared with SOEs,20
TVEs incur very little in the way of social welfare costs.   Most TVEs do not provide pensions,
medical care, or housing.   Unlike SOEs, TVEs basically have been free to set their prices, and to
decide the amount of inputs and outputs.  Aside from this, flexible management within the firm,  and
a supportive attitude from local governments are essential to the large-scale development of TVEs.
All of these factors have put TVEs in a much better position to compete and develop.  As Table 7
indicates, labor productivity of TVEs has incre ed tremendously from 389 Yuan per person in 1979
to 1668 Yuan per person in 1992.21
Small-scale industry in India
Small-scale industry (SSI) has played an important role in the industrial development of India.
In 1994, this industrial segment employed 14 million workers and accounted for 40 percent of India’s
total manufacturing output and 35 percent of its exports.  During the last three decades, this sector22
has seen consistent growth in the areas of production, employment, and exports.  In order to qualify
as small-scale, an industrial unit has to satisfy the following criteria: 
(a) The fixed investment in pla t and machinery (original value), whether held on ownership terms
or on lease, should not exceed Rs. 6 million; 
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(b) If an industrial undertaking is above the limit of Rs. 6 million, then it can continue as an SSI as
long as its fixed investment in plant and machinery does not exceed Rs. 7.5 million; moreover, it must
export at least 30 percent of its annual production by the end of third year of production; and
(c) In the case of an ancillary unit, the fixed investment in plant and machinery cannot exceed Rs. 7.5
million.
Reservation Policy for the SSI
One of the most distinct industral policies in India is the itemized reservation policy for SSI.
Under this policy, certain items have been exclusively reserved fo  manufacturing in  SSI sector.  The
objective is to protect the SSI units engaged in the manufacturing of such items from the competition
of medium- and large-scale units.  The reservation policy prevents the creation of new capacities in
the large-scale sector in areas which are well within the competence of the SSI sector so that the
small-scale units are ble to cater to the additional demands of the reserved items.  However, large-
scale units with a minimum export obligation of 75 percent of their output are allowed to enter into
the production ofreserved items.  The number of items on the reserved list have risen from 47 in
1967 to as high as 836 in 1995.  
The institutional framework has aimed at nurturing the SSI by creating a conducive
environment in which to operate. In addition, a strong incentive scheme has been put in place to
provide the SSI with a competitive edge in the market. Although institutional support and incentive
schemes have been found in a number of countries for promotion of small-scale industries, the policy
of reservation seems to be unique to India, and non-existent in other parts of the developing world.
Be that as it may, the small scale industries are not seen to be heavily engaged in the production of
reserved items. 
The question arises as to whether there is any rationale for continuing the policy of product
reservation for the SSI.  Particularly in the context of the reform program that India is currently
undertaking, such  a reservation policy is an aberration for the economy.  Despite these  reservations,
the reserved SSI has not emerged as a predominant sector in the small- scale industry. 
Incentive Schemes for Small-Scale Industries
A variety of incentives have been developed over the years to promote the SSI sector.  The
Small Scale Industrial Development Bank of India (SIDBI) provides direct assistance for specialized
marketing agencies, industrial estates, acquisition of machinery/equipment (both indigenous and
imported), equity capital through soft loan schemes (such as the eed-capital scheme and National
Equity Fund Scheme), modernization schemes, bills rediscounting, and direct discounting schemes.
In addition, state and local governments have provided financial subsidies to the SSI, including
interest rate and capital subsidies, wat r and electricity subsidies, and subsidies for the acquisition of
land.
In addition, the government provides a number of fiscal incentives to the SSI sector.  These
comprise investment allowances, tax holidays, additional depreciation for new plant and machinery,
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and excise tax concessions by the central government (the small-scale excise exemption schem
allows for tax exemptions for SSI units). Under this scheme, SSI units having annual turnover up to
rupees 3 million are exempted from payment of excise duties.  If the turnover is between rup es 3
million and 7.5 million, then duties are concessional.  The ceiling of turnover for availing the
exemption/concessions from sales taxes and turnover taxes is rupees 20 million.  With a view to
develop the backward districts, the government has provided  five-year tax holiday to new industrial
undertakings located in backward districts that are certified by the central government.  In addition,
the state and local governments provide exemption from electricity tariffs.  
The SSI sector is also entitled to certain general incentives, such as reservation of certain
items for exclusive purchase from SSIs, price preference ov r medium- and large-scale units in public
sector purchases, and schemes for self-employment for educated, unemployed youth.  Furthermore,
if the SSI unit happens to be located in a backward area, then the unit has access to special incentives,
such as concessional finance schemes, transport subsidy schemes, interest subsidy schemes, and
income tax incentives.
Since the initiation of economic reforms in India, the government has undertaken a number
of policy initiatives to achieve the objectives of the new Industrial Policy in the post-reform period.
Several measures have been undertaken for the simplification of rules and procedures in order to
achieve deregulation: disbanding of product lists that hitherto restricted SSIs, modifications of labor
laws and of registration procedures, decentralization of decision-making, and liberalization of
environmental l ws applicable to small-scale units.  In order to relieve the SSI sector from the
shortage of working capital arising from delayed payments by large enterprises and public sector for
supplies made by the SSI, an Act for the payment of interest on delayed payments to small-scale and
ancillary undertakings has been enacted. In addition, priority status has been given to the small-scale
sector in the allocation of iron and steel.    
The SSI sector raises its term-credit and working capital from commercial banks, cooperative
banks, regional rural banks, and state financial corporations.  The banking system mainly provides
working capital and term loans whenever feasible.  The state financial corporations generally provide
investment capital, but sometimes also working capital as part of a package of credit.  In addition,
the SSI is also assisted by the National Small Industries Corporation at the national level and the State
Small Industries Development Corporations at the state level through selling or renting machinery.
The Small Industries Development Bank of India was set up to provide refinancing to these units.
Moreover, credit provided by banks to the small-scale units is treated as credit to a “priority sector”.
The government has initiated a seven-point action plan to improve credit flows to the SSI sector.
Under the plan, 51 specialized SSI branches have been opened as of October 1995.  Table 8 gives
data on bank credit provided to the SSI sector.
The SSI units have registered high growth rates of employment and value addition across
industry groups.  Furthermore, Ramaswamy (1994) finds a significant increase in labor productivity
over the period 1972 to 1988, the two census years of SSI units. Moreover, the export intensity of
the SSI sector is found to be comparable to that of the private, corporate sector.  However, the
structure of the SSI sector has not significantly changed.  Relative to metal based industries, the
primary material and agro-based industries have shown higher employment generation and valu
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addition.  The latter group comprises food products, beverages and tobacco products, wood, leather,
paper products, etc.
Table 8: Bank Credit to Small-Scale Industries (Rs. billion)
Year       Net Bank Credit           To SSI          Share of SSI
March 1991 1056 168 15.89%
March 1992 1121 174 15.51%
March 1993 1388 194 14.60%
March 1994 1409 216 15.30%
Source: Ministry of Industry, Annual Report, 1994-95, Government of India, p. 198
Table 9: Small-Scale Industries
Year No. Of Units     Gross Output EmploymentExports
   (In million)      (Current prices) (In million) (Rs. billion)
As of Dec.          Rs. billion
1990-91 1.94 1553     12.53   91
1991-92 2.08 1787     12.98 139
1992-93 2.24 2093     13.40 178
1993-94 2.38 2416     13.93 253
1994-95 2.57 2940     14.65   280 
Source: Economic Survey, 1995-96, p. 125.
Contrary to the general perception that the 1991 opening up of the economy through the
liberalization process would be at the expense of the SSIs, this segment of Indian industry has
recorded a growth rate of 10 percent in real terms in 1994-95.  During the previous two years the
growth rates were 7 and 5.6 percent, respectively. ( Refer to Table 9 for details).  These growth rates
were significantly higher than the growth rates achieved by the industrial sector as a whole.  The
growth rates achieved by the SSI in the post-reform period suggest that reforms have aided growth
in the small-scale sector.  Moreover, with greater deregulation of the private sector in India and
implementation of specific reforms related to the SSI, the prospects for growth would improve
further.
According to the Expert Committee on Small Enterprises (ECSE), the government in the
present economic scenario of gl balization and competitiveness can only support, and not protect,
small-  and medium-sized enterprises, particularly with regard to technology, products, skills, and
manpower. According to the committee, the government’s responsibility was only to the weak, tiny,
and cottage sector.  Consequently, at best,  government int rvention would come only when finances
to the SSI sector were held up through a faulty system of credit recovery.    
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Comparison
TVEs and SSIs are both small-scale enterprises with an average employment level of six
workers. Although both China and India try to encourage small scale enterprises, their policy targets
are quite different, and therefore the results areas well. China and India differ in the following ways:
a) While China emphasizes initial support for the TVEs, India’s incentive schemes are available a
long as a firm remains small-scale.  China has created incentive schemes to encourage the
establishment of new TVEs, and laid emphasis on the initial stag  of development, that is, for the first
few years.   In ndia there is a clear-cut line that defines small-scale industries based on the kinds of
assistance and preferential treatments given. Being defined as small and remaining small  will ensure
continued support.
Table 10: Comparison of TVEs and SSIs(1994)
TVEs SSIs
Total export ($billion) 40.23 8.92#1
National Share of Exports 32.6% 33.4%
Employment (million) 113.3 14.7
Units (million) 18.67 2.57
Average Employment (Persons)   6.1 5.7
Share of National Credits 6.25% 15.3%
Loss-making units 76.8 225.3#2
Loss-making unit share 0.41% 8.77%#2
Source: CSSB 1995, p 537, TVE Statistical Yearbook 1995, p 6, 87, 88, 100; Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking
1995, p 474, 483; Economic Survey 1995-96, p 92, 125; Summary Statistics, Center for Monitoring Indian Economy, 1992.
Note: #1. Exchange rates used to convert into dollars are 8.4462 Yuan/Dollar and Rs 31.37/Dollar, the rates at the end of
1994. #2 refers to 1990 private sector SSI data.  
(b) While India supports SSIs through material, financial and fiscal schemes, China uses these and,
in addition, provides technical, training, and managerial support for the TVEs. China’s Spark Plan
was targeted to direct assistance to the TVEs, in terms of capital, management, training, etc., with
a view that these TVEs , while small now, will eventually grow large and compete in the international
market.  
(c) China gives additional aw rds to TVEs that export.  Since exporting is a major theme in China’s
economic policy, governments at various levels promote exports through which TVEs also benefit.
(d) To promote the SSIs, India reserves a list of goods for exclusive production by the SSIs.  In a
way, the markets for the SSIs and other firms are segmented.  Market segmentation, as economic
theory says, will only create market distortion and inefficiency, and 
(e) As India does not allow bankruptcy,  loss-making SSIs increase in number; as a result, th
percentage of loss-making SSIs is significantly higher than that for China’s TVEs.
      We calculated gross output share of SSIs by using gross output of SSIs as the numerator and India’s23
GDP as the denominator. It turns out that the share stays constant at about 33% between 1990/91 and 1993/94.
   Liu Guoguang writes: “By then, China had opened up her south east part, covering about 150 million24
population.” Gu, Nianliang, Zhihe Yang, Hangang Gu, & Xisan Zhuang, Regional Effects of China’s Special Economic
Zones, 1989, p 2.
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Although both TVEs in China and SSIs in India have grown with these preferential policies,
TVEs seem to have grown much faster.  TVEs had total employment of over 113 million in 1994,
while SSIs had only 1.4 million employees.  While the gross output-share of the TVEs increased from
7.2 percent in 1978 to 42.7 percent in 1993, gross output-share of the SSIs remained constant
between 1990/91 and 1993/94.  Though both TVEs and SSIs account for about one-third of their23
national exports, respectively, TVEs have a much higher volume.   Over the last decade, a large
number of TVEs have grown into large enterprises.
V. Special Economic Zones in China and India
In order to catch up with the advanced countries, it is essential for less developed countries
such as China and India, to adopt open door policies.  Openness not only allows the country t
specialize and use it comparative advantages,  it also benefits the country through increased access
to foreign capital, information, and advanced technology.   To facilitate such flows of trade, capital,
information and technology, many countries set up,  in the early stage of opening up, export
processing zones or special economic zones that provide preferential policies.   The success of such
zones usually has direct impacts on the entire economy, especially from the foreign perspective. 
However, the success of such zones mainly depends on their preferent al policy packages.   In this
section, we try to study the policies adopted in the special economic zones (SEZs) in China and in
the export processing zones (EPZs) and Export Oriented Units (EOUs) in India, and we compare
their performances and their roles in promoting foreign trade and investment. 
Before we discuss China’s SEZs, it may be helpful to give a broad picture of the effect and
strategies of China’s open-door policies.  The geographic development of China’s open-door policy
started in 1979 with an export processing zone in Shekou (part of Shenzhen), followed by four SEZs
in 1980, and the opening up of fourteen coastal cities in 1984. Then in 1985, the government further
opened up the Yangzhi River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, and the Southern Fujian Delta  as
economic development zones. In 1988, the fifth SEZ Hainan Province was established.   Meanwhile,24
between 1985 and 1987, the State Council announced that  fourteen economic and technological
development zones (ETDZs) in twelve of the fourteen coastal open cities would have similar
preferential policies as in the SEZs.  In 1990, the State Council set up 26 new technology
development zones with similar preferential policies to the SEZs.  Then, five  border cities were
opened in 1992, and more and more ETDZs were authorized by the State Council or the provincial
governments.  By the end of 1994, most interior capital cities and major industrial cities were also
opened.  Now, the open-door policy has radiated first from the SEZs, to fourteen coastal cities, and
many ETDZs, mostly in the coast, to the border cities, and to the interior capital cities and major
industrial areas.  The open areas have spread so fast that it is almost impossible to keep track of the
 Since Deng’s south tour, more kinds and number of zones have been opened all over the country.  By the25
end of 1992, there were more than 2700 zones, some of them were authorized by counties or by cities which are not
legal. (See Gao, Wang, & He, 1993, p 138.)  However, realizing many of such zones are redundant, the central
government had closed 1274 zones by the end of 1994. (See Almanac of China’s Economic Relations and Foreign Trade
1995/96, p 85.)  Now only zones authorized other than by the State Council or by the provincial governments are valid.
 CSSB, People’s Daily Overseas Edition, March 7, 1996, p 5.26
 Hainan Province was a part of Guangdong Province until 1988.27
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number of zones, area coverage, and popultion affected.  A reasonable guess of the number of such
zones in China, whatever they are called, would be more than a thousand.  As a result of the success25
of opening up, China’s foreign trade volume has doubled every five years since the reforms.  The
actual amount of foreign capital used increased from $2.7 billion in 1984 to $48.4 billion in 1995.
More than 234,000 enterprises with foreign investment were registered in 1995.  Such foreign
enterprises accounted for 39 percent of China’s total foreign trade in 1995.  26
Keeping this broad picture of China’s openness in mind, we ow  look deeper into why China
has been so successful by focusing on the SEZ.  How did the SEZs evolve and what policies have
been adopted for the SEZs?  Then we will compare China’s SEZs with India’s export processing
zones.
  
China’s SEZs were established soon after the government began its the co omic reforms.
In 1980, the central government approved proposals from Guangdong and Fujian provinces that both
provinces have more flexible economic policies in order to promote foreign trade and investment
through their location advantage and mass overseas Chinese connections. Then, four SEZs were set
up: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Santou in Guangdong province, and Xiamen in Fujian province.    Later
on in 1988, Hainan Province was also designated as an SEZ.  With the immediate success of the27
SEZs, in 1984 and 1985, the government opened up coastal cities, and set up economic and
technological development zones (ETDZs, which provide similar preferential policies).  In 1992, the
government opened the interior provincial capitals and border cities.  After seventeen years of
reforms, China has experienced an openi g up spanning  the south to the north, and from the east to
the interior and the west, i.e., all over the country.
Given the key role the SEZs have played in China’s opening up and economic reforms, we
have chosen to s udy their economic development and the preferential policies them.  All five SEZs
used to be relatively poor and located in the southern part of China.  However, their location
advantage (close to Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) and connections to the outside world, to a great
extent, helped the flow of information, and trade and capital, especi lly in the initial stages of opening
up.  Such changes are evidenced by increases in GDP, employment, exports, foreign capital inflows,
and the number of enterprises.   Shenzhen is the most successful of the SEZs.  In 1979, the year prior
to establishment of SEZ for Shenzhen, there were only 224 small factories; by 1989, Shenzhen City
had 6,470 enterprises, and its GDP reached 9.3 billion Yuan, thereby increasing at an annual
  Data on Shenzhen in this paragraph are drawn from Yearbook of China’s SEZs and Coastal Economic 28
and Technological Development Zones 1980-89, p 22.
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compounded rate of 47 percent for ten years.  In terms of employment, the number of staff and28
workers (basically employment in the organized sector) wa  only 26,500 in 1980, but by 1991, it had
increased to 648,800.  The increases in foreign trade and foreign capital are even more impressive.
 While Shenzhen exported only $9.3 million in 1979, the volume increased to $3.5 billion in 1991,
and to $18.3 billion in 1994.  
Basically, all five SEZs experienced immense success, as shown in table 11.  While the SEZs
have less than one percent of the national population, and about 1.5 percent of formal sector
employment, they accounted for 3.27 percent of the national GDP, 21.8 percent of total exports, and
12.6 percent of foreign capital utilization, (which includes loans and foreign direct investment) in
1994.  The success of SEZs in foreign trade, capital inflows, nd economic growth quickly spread
to the rest of the country: first to the open coastal cities, ETDZs and other zones, then through
trading with te interior regions to almost every corner of the country.  As a result, the country has
experienced compound annual growth rate of 10 percent since 1978.  Exports increased from $9.8
billion in 1978 to $148.8 billion in 1995.  Foreign capital inflow increased from $2.7 billion in 1984
to $38.1 billion in 1995.  As of 1995, 258,000  projects involving foreign investment have been
approved, and 120,000 enterprises with foreign investment are operating in China, employing more
than 16 million workers.
As is well known, China had a closed and centrally pla ned economy prior to its reforms.  As
economic reforms began in 1978, the Chinese government wanted to break away from the traditional
economic system.   Thus, SEZs were set up for thispurpose, and  they have been acting as economic
laboratories for the market economy and bridges to the outside world.  Differing from the rest of
China, the economies of the SEZs depend on  market forces r ther than the plan.  Local governments
in the SEZs have more power in making regulations and approving foreign investment projects. 
In order to create a competitive economic environment, preferential policies were adopted
for investors, as well. In 1980, the corporate tax rate for SEZs was set at only 15 percent (Table 12)
at a time when tax rates elsewhere went up to as high as 55 percent for domestic firms and 40 percent
for foreign firms. Foreign investors receive extra tax benefits of two y ar f exemption from the date
when the firm starts generating profits, followed by a 50 percent tax reduction for nother hree years.
To promote exports, an additional 10 percent tax reduction has been set up  for firms that export
more than 70 percent of their products, an  export duties are also exempt for goods produced in the
SEZs.   Import duties are exempt for equipment, parts, materials used for production purposes, and
daily necessities used for consumption purposes.   To show the government’s determination and
commitment to the SEZ policies, land was leased to foreign investors for up to 50 years (later on, it
was extended to a maximum of 70 years).  Land usage fees were set very low, and were exempt or
reduced for from one to five years.  Property taxes were also exempt for three to five years to
encourage foreign investors.  To attract people to work in the SEZs, individual income taxes were
reduced by 50 percent of the national level; in addition, the interest income of foreigners is exempt
from individual income tax.   Labor mobility was also encouraged right from the beginning.
Professionals or highly skilled workers were allowed to move to work in the SEZs regardless of the
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then-rigid household registry system.  Workers wer  allowed to move from company to company,
and firm managers had the right to pay employees according to their merit and even fire them, if
necessary.
Table 11: China’s Special Economic Zones
    National 
Names Shenzhen Zhuhai Santou Xiamen Hainan     Share
Year Established 1980 1980 1981 1981 1988        of SEZs 
Area Coverage sq km 327.5 121 234 131 33931 0.36%
GDP (million Yuan)
     1979/1980*     196  380*  na na na  na
     1991 17446 6045 3720 6250 10900 2.05%
     1994     na  na  na na na 3.27%
Staff & Workers (1000)
     1980   26.5   24.1 222.1 185.1   954.5
1.49%
     1991 648.8 185.7        368.9277.7 1077.4#1         #2
1.76%
Exports (mil dollar)
     1980       11       9   232   140 na  na#3
     1991   3446   699 1024 1151 670 9.73%
     1994 18309 1488 2202 3389 987 21.79%
Foreign Capital Utilization (mil dollar)
     1980      27   16 na na na  na
     1991    580 170 197   183 216 11.65%
     1994  1730 763 774 1241 918 12.56%
Source: China’s SEZs & ETDZs Yearbook 1980-89, 1990-92. Gao, Wang & He, 1993, p 2227. CSSB, Almanac of China’s Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade 1995/96.
Notes: #1 refers to 1991's data, from China’s SEZs and Coastal Economic and Technological Development Zones Yearbook 1990-92,
p 74.  #2 is estimated according to Gao, Wang & He, 1993, p 2227 “In ten years since the establishment of Xiamen SEZ, Xiamen created
92.6 thousand jobs.” #3 refers to 1982's data.
The result of such policies has been that SEZs not only succeeded in attracting foreign capital,
technology, information and management skills, and increased foreign trade and economic growth,
but they also trained millions of workers and managers who now understand  how a market economy
operates and have experience  in a competitive economy.   Ma y people also learned management
skills and built up business relations with foreign partners.  The indirect effects  and feedback on
economic reform provided to the central government and other  governments are, if anything, even
more profound.  As we discussed earlier, it is the success of policies toward  the SEZs that has led
to widespread opening up of China.
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 Table 12:  Major Preferential Policies for SEZs in China
   General Guide-         Corporate Tax  Tax,  Property Tax     Import/Export
         Lines      & Land Usage          Duties
   Individual Income    
1. Foreign Capital is the1. Corporate tax rate is 1. Import duties are
major source for 15% for enterprises exempt for equipment,
development fund. located in the SEZs. No parts, raw materials,
2. Economic activities and other production
depend on market forces,2. Profit reinvested in the materials purchased by
rather than the state plan.SEZs are exempt from enterprises located in the
3. Local governments haveapplication. purposes. (This policy is
more power in making being phased out starting
regulations, approving 3. Enterprises with in  1995.)
foreign investment foreign investment enjoy
projects. 1 to 3 year corporate tax 2. Daily necessity goods
4. Special treatments forfrom the date when firms purposes, except cigarettes
enterprises in SEZs: taxhave positive profits), and wines, are exempt
holiday or reduced tax and 50% reduction of from import duties.
rates, accelerated corporate tax for
depreciation rates additional 3 years. 3. Exports of goods
(generally 5-10 years), produced in the SEZs with
flexible policies on 4. Enterprises that export domestic materials, except
imports and exports. more than 70% of their for raw oil or oil products
5. The amounts of fiscal10% reduction in state has specified, are
revenues and foreign corporate tax. exempt from industrial and
exchange earnings to be commercial consolidated
transferred to the central5.  Business incomes of taxes (and export duties?).
government are fixed, banks and insurance
revenue or earnings abovecompanies are exempt 4. Exports of goods
the quota belong to the from industrial and produced in the SEZs with
local governments. commercial consolidated imported
6. Capital or profits of their establishment. industrial and commercial
foreign investors are freeAfter the five-year consolidated taxes.
to flow in and out of the exemption period, the tax
country. rate is 3%.
additional local tax. transportation vehicles,
corporate tax upon SEZs for production
exemption (counting used for consumption
products are allowed or other products that the
taxes for 5 years from  materials are exempt from
Individual income tax:
1. 50% of the individual
income generated in the
SEZs that is subject to
Individual Income Tax Law
of the People’s Republic of
China is exempt from
individual income tax. 
2. Interest income of non-
citizenship is exempt from
individual income tax until
1995. (It is not known
whether it is still in effect.)
Property tax:
Foreign investors are
exempt from property taxes
for three to five years for
the real estate property that
they newly bought or built.
Land usage:
1. Land is leased to foreign
investors up to 70 years. 
2. Land usage fees are
reduced or exempt for 1-5
years depending on various
situations: used for business
operation, or for
production; if it  introduces
high technology; and
whether it is developed la
or not.
 
Sources: Regulations on SEZs in Guangdong province in A Comprehensive Book of Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic
of China, 1995; China’s Special Economic Zones and Coastal Economic and Technological Development Zones Yearbook, 1980-89,
1990-92; Gao, Wang & He, 1993; A Comprehensive Book of Practical Economic Laws of China; A Comprehensive Book of Economy,
Vol 73, 1994.
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Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and Export-Oriented Units (EOUs) in India
The export processing zones were set up as enclaves and separated from the domestic tariff
area by fiscal barriers, with a view to provide an internationally competitive, duty free environment
for export production at low cost.  The first EPZ in India was established in Kandla in 1965.  India
now has seven export processing zones, namely Kandla (Gujarat); Santacruz (Bombay); Falta (West
Bengal); Noida (Uttar Pradesh); Cochin (Kerala); Madras (Tamil Nadu); nd Visakhapatnam (Andhra
Pradesh).  The Santacruz EPZ is meant exclusively for the export of electronics and gems and
jewellery items, whereas the other EPZs are multi-product zones.
Each of the zones provides  basic infrastructure, such as developed land for construction of
factory sheds, standard-design factory buildings providing ready-built sheds, and roads, power, water
supply and drainage.  In addition, customs clearance is arranged within the zone at no extra charge.
Promotional policies for EPZs in India are given in Table 13.
The Export-Oriented Unit (EOU) scheme was introduced in early 1981 and is complementary
to the EPZ scheme. The EOU adopts the same production regime but offers a wider option of
locations, with reference to factors like sources of raw materials, ports of export, hinterland facilities,
availability of technological skills, existence of an industrial base, and the need for a larger area o
land for the project.  As of March 1995, there were 523 units operating under the EOU scheme.  The
EPZ operating units broadly fall under the product groups of electronics, engineeri g items, chemicals
and allied products, gem and jewellery, textiles, garments, plastics and rubber products.  On the other
hand, EOUs are mainly concentrated in engineering, chemicals and plastics, granites, textiles, food
processing, agriculture, aquaculture, steel, and forest products. 
Exports from EOU/EPZ, which stood at Rs. 33.16 billion in 1992-93, rose to Rs. 48.59 billion
in 1993-94, thus representing a growth of over 46 percent.  In th  ase of EPZs, exports during April
to November 1994 were on the order of Rs. 11.21 billion, while EOUs accounted for Rs. 16.42
billion from April- September 1994.
Under the Export-Import policy for 1992-97, the following modifications have been made:
a) automatic approval under certain onditions to proposals for setting up units; b) leasing of capital
goods from domestic companies by EPZ/EOUs; c) streamlining of procedures for domestic tariff area
(DTA) sale and rationalization of duty structure; d) revision of the value addition formula by
excluding indigenous raw materials to make value addition on the basis of net foreign exchange
earnings; and e) permission for the development of EPZs by the private, state, or joint sectors.  In
fact, proposals for setting up two private EPZs have been cleared, and these are to be set up in
Bombay and Surat.  Promotional policies applicable to the EPZs have been announced by the
government at different points of time. 
In August 1994, the government introduced a centrally sponsored Export Promotion
Industrial Park (EPIP) scheme.  This was primarily enacted with a view to involving the state
governments in the creation of infrastructural facilities for export-oriented production.  The scheme
provides that 75 percent of the capital expenditure incurred towards creation of such facilities,
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ordinarily limited to Rs.100 million in each case, will be met by a central grant to the state
governments.  In addition, a maintenance grant equivalent to 2 percent of export turnover of each unit
established therein will also be made available to the state governments for a period of 5 years from
the date of commercial production of that unit.  As of March 1995, the central government had
approved EPIPs in 10 states of the Indian union. 
Table 13: Promotional Policies for the Export Processing Zones in India
               General Incentives                     Fiscal Incentives
No upper limit to foreign ownership share, even in theA tax holiday of five years on all corporate profits (can
non-priority industries. choose 5 consecutive years within the first eight years of
No customs duties on raw materials, components,
tooling, etc. Exemption from central excise duties on all zone
No import licences were required even prior to the
reforms, as all imports into the zone were placed underExemption from central sales tax. In addition, in some
the Open General Licence. zones there is exemption from state sales tax, octroi
Locally procured supplies from the DTA treated as
exports, thus attracting all export incentives for theCr dit is made available to the zones at preferential rates
suppliers. from central and state financial agencies.
Blanket foreign exchange sanctions for business tripsSubsidized rentals and lease rates for built-up sheds, and
abroad. factory space. 
Repatriation of capital up to the extent of originalNo rent is to be paid for the first two years, only 15
investment. percent has to be paid in the next two years, and full rent
Repatriation of profits and dividends after payment of
tax. Plots are leased for 30 years at Rs 10 per sq.  meter per
Duty-free imports of capital goods and equipment.
Priority release of cement, steel, telephone, and telexoutput in the domestic tariff area. Some fixed percentage
connections. of the waste, seconds, and scraps can be sold in the
Packing credit facilities for a period of 180 days without
production of firm export orders. Term finance at concessional rates of interest for fixed
establishment).
manufactures.
duties, property tax, etc. 
has to be paid only from the beginning of the fifth year.
annum.
The zone units are allowed to sell 25 percent of their
DTA.
assets.
Free remittance of profits and dividends earned by the
foreign investor after taxes.
Source: Annual Reports of Ministries of  Commerce and Industry, various issues. 
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Table 14: Performance of Export Processing Zones
Exports
Name of Zone Number of 1981 1989 1990 1991
and No. Of units persons (US $Million)
employed
KAFTZ, 107 11,000 NA 203 254 173
SEEPZ, 115 10,500 NA 174 217 203
NEPZ, 71   4500 NA   31   25   29
MEPZ, 107   6616 NA   18   34   50
CEPZ, 23   2170 NA     7     3   12
FEPZ, 12     400 NA   10   14   11
Total= 435 35,186 218 443 547 478
National Exports 8704        16955       18477       18266
EPZ Exports Share 2.5% 2.6% 3.0% 2.6%
Source: Economic Survey, 1992-93, p 108, 1994-95, p s-71, s72.
 
The performance of India’s export processing zones has been far from satisfactory,  as can
be seen in Table 14.  EPZs in India have neither been successful in promoting exports n r in attracting
foreign investment.  As a proportion of total Indian exports, the exports from EPZs have more or less
been constant. Despite all the incentives, the EPZs hav  performed rather poorly in attracting foreign
investment.  There are  number of reasons for such disappointing performance: 
(a) the objective of attracting foreign direct investment was not explicitly stated  until the
commencement of the Indian reforms.  Since the Indian economy was highly regulated and controlled
until 1991, the policy enclave nature of EPZs became stronger rather than more diffuse.  The EPZs
have lacked dynamism because of their relatively limited scale;
(b) the authorities wanted the EPZs to achieve multiple objectives, however, fulfilling some of these
often involved trade-offs with others.  In fact, at times, some of these objectives were seen to be
patently unsuited to EPZs.  For instance, with regard to the Kandla and the Santacruz EPZs, the
objectives of developing backward regions and promoting small-scale units diverted the zones from
their primary objective of attracting foreign capital and raising export earnings; 
(c) The lack of infrastructural facilities has also prevented the EPZs from performing as well as they
should have.  Adequate infrastructure is seen to be available only in two out of the seven EPZs
established so far;
(d) the facility of  single-window clearance has not really been effective.  The boards of the different
zones do not have the power to grant clea ces because they  are only advisory bodies and the final
orders are given by the parent departments.  All the companies need to get clearance from the
Secretariat of Industrial Approvals and also from the Ministry of Commerce; 
 On this issue, the Tandon Committee (1982) remarked in its Report that “our problem has been the ad-29
hoc granting of incentives.....”, p. 88. 
 The Tandon Committee (1982) suggested that “a comprehensive package of incentives should be provided30
and then advertised as a lasting offer instead of piecemeal sporadic exemptions, concessions, and relaxations of the
past.....”, p.68
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(e) although all the EPZs (except the Noida EPZ), have port facilities nearby, these have not been
able to attract major shipping companies; and 
(f) incentives in India for the EPZ investors have almost always been announced in a piecemeal
manner.  Moreover, the incentives were also withdrawn at times.  For the investor, such changes29
create uncertainty and confusion.  Clearly, investors would prefer a degree of predictability in policies
over a relatively long period.  This could not be assured given the manner in which incentives to the
zones were handled.   As a consequence, the EPZs failed to attract foreign investors.    30
In a comprehensive study Kumar (1989) suggests that tax holidays in India have not been a
very significant incentive for attracting foreign capital, in fact, they have  ranked below other
measures such as  single-window clearance and healthy labor relations.  Tax holidays are not
attractive for two reasons.  First, because it is difficult for a unit to start earning profits within one
or two years of its establishment.  Second, multinational corporations use transfer pricing to reduce
their taxable income in the host economies.  While tax holidays for the first five years are not an
attractive incentive, in any case these too were introduced in India for the first time in 1980.  In the
mid-1980s, however, this incentive was redesigned and entrepreneurs were given the option to
choose five consecutive years within the first eight years of  establishment  to avail of this holiday.
Among other things, Kumar suggests the setting up of an EPZ Authority  to ensure single-window
clearance, a uniform set of incentives for all the zones, and for planning, establishing, promoting, and
efficient running of the zones. 
Comparison:
The performances of China’s SEZs and India’s EPZs have differed vastly.  Data provided  in
Table 11 for the former and Table 14 for the latter provide evidence to this effect.  While the SEZs
of China had export earnings totaling $6,990 million in 1991, the six EPZs of India put together had
exports of a mere $478 million.  In fact, Hainan SEZ, (with the lowest export earnings among the five
SEZs in China) at $670 million, was by itself 40 percent higher than what all of the EPZs in India put
together exported in 1991. In addition, Chinese SEZs have also created far more employment
opportunities than their counterparts in India.  Shenzen alone employed a higher number of persons
in 1991 than all the EPZs put together in India.  Furthermore, when comparing the foreign capital
inflows in the zones of the respective countries, one finds that China is far better placed than India.
While foreign capital inflows amounted to  modest sums until 1991, they have witnessed a
tremendous jump in 1994.  By contrast, the EPZs in India have failed to attract foreign investments
of any sizable sum.
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Several reasons account for the poor performance of EPZs in India compared with the
commendable performance of SEZs in China.  First, while the SEZs in China were established with
a view to attracting foreign capital and promoting Chinese exports, in India, EPZs had numerous
objectives.  Some of these wre patently unsuitable for an export processing zone.  The objective of
attracting foreign direct investment was not explicitly stated until the commencement of the reforms
in India.
Table 15: Comparison of SEZs and EPZs (1991)
SEZs EPZs
Total Exports ($million) 6990 478
Share of National Exports 9.7% 2.6%
Employment (000's) 2558.5 35.2
Source: Table 11 and Table 14.
Second, the EPZs in India are much smaller in size than the SEZs in China. Moreover, China
developed a comprehensive package of incentives for the SEZs soon after their establishment.  In
contrast, incentives for the Indian EPZs have almost always been announced in a piecemeal manner.
Also, incentives in China for SEZs cover a much wider arena of preferential policies than is the case
in India.  
Third, the provincial and local governments in China have a much greater say in the
formulation of regulations and in the approval of foreign investment projects.  In India, on the other
hand, the states ar  severely constrained by the lack of power in this regard, that is, only the central
government has the authority to devise regulations or approve projects.  
Fourth, the strategic Chinese policy of locating the zo es in Guangdong and Fujian provinces
has paid rich dividends.  With geographical proximity to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao d the
connections with the overseas Chinese, the SEZs had easy access to foreign capital, technology, and
information.  The investments made by the overseas Chinese in the early years of the SEZ
establishment led to a situation in which investments then started pouring in from other parts of the
world.  Needless to say, no such comparative advantages existed in the case of EPZs in India.  
Finally, foreign investors have not been comfortable with the 75 percent export obligation
requirement in India that was in place until th beginning of reforms. Although the incentives offered
by India and China are comparable, the results achieved by the SEZs in China and the EPZs in India
are vastly different.  China has, in fact, followed a flexible policy with regard to export obligations.
In the post-reform period, however, India too is moving towards more liberal and flexible policies.
  
VI. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have attempted to compare the post- form scenario in China and India with
spect to a few selected issues of industrial policy.  Reforms in China are much older than they are in
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India, and hence a comparative analysis helps us derive lessons el vant to India from the experiences
of China.  Notwithstanding the fact that there are a number of differences between the two
economies,  however, there are significant similaritie  as well that  make a strong case for comparing
the two.
A comparison of economic development in the two countries shows that macro economic
conditions in China are much better than in India.  While China’s population growth r e has been
much lower than India’s, its growth rate as far as the labor force is concerned has been higher.  In
addition, China’s urban unemployment rate has been kept low.  China also has more than a 50 percent
higher rate of savings and investments than India.  Although China was rather closed to the outside
in 1979, it now is more open than India, with more foreign capital inflows and a higher foreign trade
volumes.   While China’s debt ratio and debt service ratio are both within safe limits, this is not the
case in India.  During the last decade and a half, China’s GDP growth rate  has been more than double
that of India’s; but on the other hand, China’s inflation rate has remained in double digits.
In the area of deregulation, our findings suggest considerable gains for China’s non-state
sector.  With extensive price reforms, particularly in agricultural commodities, there was a boom in
the agricultural sector.  The surplus income of the farmers was invested in TVEs, which  led to a
flourishing rural industry. And with the relaxation of restrictions on labor mobility, surplus
agricultural abor made full use of the choices that were available, that is, one could either set up
businesse  anywhere one wanted or take up employment in urban or rural industry.  By contrast,
while labor mobility has not been a problem in India, price controls certainly have.  Although the
government has decontrolled prices of a number of industrial products in the last five years, a large
number of agricultural commodities continue to have state-administered prices.
The area of restructuring and liquidation of firms is also one where China has moved far ahead
of India.  While legal and regulatory obligations in India do not permit firms to restructure or close
down if need be, th same is feasible in China in the non-state sector.  Stringent labor and land laws
in India are major hurdles that get in the way of restructuring firms.  In the absence of flexibility on
these fronts, it is only natural for foreign firms to look to other locations for investment purposes.
Deregulation of the private sector in India is therefore  tremendously important if India is to perform
as well as China has done.
Our comparison of China’s TVEs with India’s SSIs shows that, while the former ar
supported by the state in their initial stages of development for the first few years, the latter continue
to take advantage of the incentives as long as they remain small (per the official definition of a small-
scale firm).  Since a plethora of incentives are offered to th  SSI, firms  tend to remain small-scale
in order to enjoy the advantages of being small, unless, of course, they see larger profits in crossing
over the dividing line.   By and large, the tendency of the small-scale firms in India has been to stay
that way in order to reap all the benefits.  Second, the policy of item-reservation for the SSI needs
to be done away with.  Apart from causing distortions, this policy has done little else that is positive:
in fact, the number of items reserved for production in the SSI has gone up considerably - from 47
items in 1967 to as many as 836 in 1995.    
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Our comparative analysis of SEZs in China and EPZs in India suggests that, while both
countries have offered more or less a similar package of incentives, the former have been much more
successful compared to the latter.  Among other things, this is particularly true for foreign investment
flows, export earnings, and employment generation.  Ironically, while India established her first EPZ
in 1965 compared with China’s initial efforts in 1980, the Indian EPZs never seemed to take off --
either in attracting investment or promoting exports.  As discussed earlier, the overseas Chinese based
in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and in other South East Asia countries  played a crucial role in the
success of the SEZs in China. 
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